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MARC REISNER,

In many ways, environmental history provides the context from
which environmental law and policy stem. The laws and policies
embody the dreams of nostalgists and regulators alike. But the making of
them is often much messier, like making sausage, and the actual history
reminds us that the laws may not become a blueprint for how to manage
the natural world.
In its brief modem history, environmental history has filled in
the story of the creation of environmental law, charting not only the
establishment of the corpus of statute but providing a picture of the
cultural context, premises, values, constraints, and political structure that
stemmed from them as well. If the laws themselves tell us what people
decided, environmental history reveals why they made the choices they
did, what made them see the range of options they considered, and, in
some cases, why avenues of decision that seem open to the present were
closed in the past. In this, environmental history offers a roadmap, a
guide to the cultural impulse that underpins natural resource law. In
turn, these explanations provide insight into the reasons that
environmental laws offer the options they do and the policies that they
birth have the limits they contain. In the end, environmental history also
demonstrates why environmental law does not answer some of the
pivotal questions of our time.
A Brief History of Environmental History
The discipline of environmental history, the study of human
interaction with the physical world over time, does much to illuminate
these limitations. Although the roots of modem environmental history
can be traced to writers such as Walter Prescott Webb, author of The
Great Plains (Grosset & Dunlap 1931), and the Annales School in France
and its descendants such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, from a policy
perspective, Samuel P. Hays emerges as the founder. His seminal work,
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation
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Movement (Harvard 1959), inaugurated the integration of history and
policy as he assessed the rise of the conservation movement and the
motivations of its leaders. Along with the more ideological Roderick
Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (Yale 1967), Hays opened the
way for the emergence of modem environmental history.
Hays and Nash together carved a broad path for environmental
history. Hays fashioned a nuts-and-bolts policy history, a look at what
the issues of the time were and how conservationists banded together to
solve them through the use of influence that led to legislation. In this, the
conservationists were typical Progressive era Americans: they believed
that passing a law assured that all right-minded citizens would respect
its provisions. In their view, statute alone would be sufficient. Good
Americans would abide by the law because it was the law, would see the
virtue in the corrective legislation, and would add whatever law forbid
to the list of taboos of late Victorian America.
Nash offered a different picture, a vision of the American
response to the natural world as simultaneously a fear of the wild and,
later, a response to its scarcity. Echoing the noted historian Frederick
Jackson Turner, who fashioned a sense of loss from the announcement of
the closing of the American frontier in 1890, Nash strongly insinuated
that the appreciation for wilderness stemmed from its scarcity in a
rapacious industrial society-and from the sense of loss that
accompanied the transformation of America from agriculture to industry
and the urbanization that accompanied it.
Together the two created an intellectual rationale and an analysis
of its application as the regulatory state took shape. Although Nash was
decidedly passionate, the two illustrated how widely held sentiments
created law that led to policy and eventually started a set of management
practices that became American institutions. In another sense, Nash and
Hays together explained why the federal agencies created in the first two
decades of the twentieth century-the Reclamation Service, the United
States Forest Service, and the National Park Service prominent among
them--bore the "service" moniker rather than that of "agency" or
"bureau." The impulse came from the same place as Woodrow Wilson's
call for "Princeton to the nation's service" during his tenure as president
of that venerated institution. Early conservation was noblesse oblige, part
of the building material of a maturing society.
During the two decades following 1970, a strident advocacy and
a strong moral tone marked the emergence of environmental history. In a
manner similar to the role of scholarship about race, class, and gender,
environmental history provided scholarly justification for the goals of the
environmental movement. Environmental historians became advocates
of the environment; they argued against the main currents of American
and world society, embracing the ethos of the 1960s, creating a pantheon
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of heroes, and using history to suggest alternative visions of a better
world. This was a complicated dance, powerful at times, but easy for its
opponents to dismiss as partisanship. This environmental history made
its mark in the classroom, not the boardroom or in hearings. Part and
parcel of the American Cultural Revolution, the constellation of changes
colloquialized as "the 1960s," its reach was as great as the movement that
spawned it and equally limited.
In this first generation, Donald Worster emerged as the leader.
Worster's first major book, Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas
(Cambridge 1977) presented the first articulation of an intellectual
relationship between scientific thought and nature. Worster's idea and
his later work became the basis of a type of environmental thought that I
call the "tragedy school." In a compelling and even seductive
formulation, Worster treated-human endeavor as a fall from grace, from
a purer time in which a smaller humanity embraced agriculture and was
able to limit its impact on the land. This declensionist thinking reflected
strains from Roderick Nash's work but reached full fruition in Worster's
Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (Oxford 1979), an indictment of
capitalism and American attitudes toward the physical world. A
compelling and influential scholar, a man with the passion of John Muir,
Worster brilliantly blended advocacy and scholarship, passion and
insight, and shaped the direction of environmental history for the
subsequent decade, in the process all but burying the policy dimensions
of the field.
A counter trend to Worster's point of view emerged at about the
same time, pointing the way toward assessing policy and law from a
different perspective. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, scholars analyzed
the environmental actions of societies and the consequences of those
decisions, gradually attaining distance from the position of defending
nature-although that component remained prominent-and moving
toward weighing the impacts of human endeavor and factoring in the
consequences of cultural choices. Despite his position as one of the
leading advocate-scholars in environmental history, Worster receives
much of the credit for this innovation. Both Dust Bowl and Rivers of
Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (Oxford 1985)
persuasively argued that ecological disasters and the hierarchical
societies they produced were the consequences of cultural choices and
human actions far more than the result of environmental circumstances.
From Rivers of Empire, it was a short step to an even more
complicated look at the way human societies interact with the physical
world around them. In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, a series of books,
most prominently Richard White, Roots of Dependency: Subsistence,
Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos
(Nebraska 1983), William deBuys Enchantment and Exploitation: The Life
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and Hard Times of a New Mexico Mountain Range (Knopf 1985), and
William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (Norton
1992), convincingly argued that human values and the decisions they
spawned were at the core of the transformation of environment, creating
in their aftermath some environmentally untenable situations. Cronon
went so far as to suggest that nature was not a constant. There could be
different kinds of nature, an idea that adherents to a catholic view of
nature found difficult to swallow. White, deBuys, and Cronon saw a
vibrant nature responding to human endeavor, but in their formulation,
culture more than nature lay at the core of environmental
transformation.
During the 1990s, this idea acquired the sobriquet "the social
construction of nature." Articulated in an amazing array of ways and
places, prominently in the influential collection Uncommon Ground:
Toward Reinventing Nature (Norton 1996), edited by William Cronon, this
general idea virtually assured that the era of reverence in environmental
history had come to an end. After Cronon, even the most fervent had a
hard time believing in a pristine nature. For policy scholars, this
evolution had positive results. The older advocacy view left little room
for policy analysis. When environment was morally right, it was hard to
weigh options-a problem that environmental professionals faced as
well. Negotiating for environment meant compromise, and in an era
when organizations such as Earth First!, with its motto, "no compromise
in defense of mother earth," dotted the landscape, a middle position that
attained results and engendered respect remained elusive. As the older
advocate perspective was diminished and replaced by a clear intellectual
rationale, the field made room for an articulated policy approach to
environmental history.
Policy and Environmental History
Water is perhaps the most widely studied question in
environmental history and for good reason. As the best histories of
water-Worster, Rivers of Empire; Donald J. Pisani, From Family Farm to
Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California and the West, 1850-1930
(California 1984), To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law and Public Policy,
1848-1902 (New Mexico 1992), and Water, Land, and Law in the West: The
Limits of Public Policy, 1985-1920 (Kansas 1996); and Norris Hundley, Jr.,
The Great Thirst: Californians and Water, A History (revised edition,
University of California Press 2001)-show, the control of water,
especially in the western half of the nation, provides the control of the
direction of the society in question. There is a direct line between owning
water and dominating society. Nowhere in twentieth-century America is
the role of policy more prominent in determining who gets water;
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nowhere are the consequences for the losers as grave nor the successes of
the winners as great.
A closer look at this remarkable body of scholarship reveals
powerful trends. Water is a "might makes right" business; social good is
in the eye of the beholder and can be construed in many ways, negating
arguments about common goals and shared resources. Water
management is a superficially democratic process in the sense that
institutions of democratic government play a role in determining the
direction that water-and the wealth that accompanies it-will travel.
Even more, this story, told from the many viewpoints of outstanding
scholars, suggests the power of bureaucracy and its ability to inflict its
wishes on other constituencies.
This of course is the story of Chinatown, the 1975 film that turns
on the ability to bring water to the desert of southern California. This is
an often-told story, with writers as diverse as the late journalist Marc
Reisner, Cadillac Desert: the American West and its Disappearing Water
(Viking 1986) chiming in, and its most basic processes, the transfer of
water from rural to urban uses, called "reallocation," is now underway at
an even faster pace than William Mulholland and the fictional Jake Gittes
ever dreamed. Reallocation figuratively takes water from the cotton
fields outside of Yuma, Arizona, and deposits it at water parks like the
Schlitterbahn in New Braunfels, Texas, emphasizing one economic
regime over another in exactly the manner of the struggles of the early
twentieth century. The process is already well underway in California,
where the numbers reveal a surprising reality. In California in 1990, 19.4
percent of the water used went to non-agricultural purposes. The more
than 80 percent of rural agricultural water generated about two percent
of the state's gross income, an inefficiency so great that it overcomes
even the value of California's fabulous agricultural bounty.
Reallocation inspires deep-seeded passion, for it suggests an
administrative rewriting of customs of the past one hundred years. Like
the farmers of the Owens Valley, who took out an advertisement that
read, "We who are about to die salute you," as Los Angeles drained
them of their water in the 1910s, the rural West of today sees in the shift
of water to urban use a kind of social genocide that renders them not
only irrelevant, but destitute. They argue for their viability with "culture
and custom" arguments, romantic figments of their imagination that
tugged on the heartstrings of many but demonstrated how archaic their
philosophy was as well as how much power the rural West had lost. For
generations, they won this battle through careful manipulation of state
and federal redistricting and by using the power they attained as the
oligarchic beneficiaries of federal water to grease campaign coffers. By
the late 1970s, they began to stumble, and as they lost power, a backlash
against change emanated from the rural West. It argued for a
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perpetuation of obviously inefficient practices for the social good they
created and, even more, for the extension of greater federal resources to
rural areas.
The Sagebrush Rebellion, as the movement that gave these ideas
credence was called, was not really new; it merely reshaped the
objections of the previous century in current terms. The rebellion was
about land, but its ideals applied equally to water. Rebels believed that
mining, ranching, and agriculture still held sway in the rural West, even
though most western states were more than 90 percent urban. As R.
McGreggor Cawley, Federal Anger, Western Land: The Sagebrush Rebellion
and Environmental Politics (Kansas 1993) suggests, the Sagebrush Rebels
were heir to a long tradition that argued for local control. Their
complaints sounded like characteristic griping but struck a chord in a
changing nation. Advocating an updated version of "states' rights," the
idea that state authority supersedes federal authority, the Sagebrush
rebels fashioned local government as the most-and sometimes
only-viable form of democracy.
This philosophy was hardly new; instead it was a challenge to
the way the United States had operated since the Civil War. That war
had been about the concept of union as much as the issue of slavery; its
aftermath had been proof of the supremacy of the federal system in the
United States. Although throughout the late nineteenth century and the
first half of the twentieth, federal authority endured numerous attacks
aimed at its authority over federal land, its supremacy held into the
1970s. Despite the anti-authoritarian cast of the 1960s, even that
tumultuous decade saw the expansion of federal power and the use of it
to protect land from development rather than to allow it to move from
national to local hands. In this context, the Sagebrush Rebellion seemed
anachronistic, a relic of an earlier America.
The larger trends in American society did little to suggest to
rural westerners, themselves threatened not only by the changing
economic climate but by the changing culture of American society, that
they should cede age-old prerogative. The rural West prided itself on its
self-reliant traditions, rarely acknowledging the role of federal subsidies
for water, electricity, and even grazing that underpinned their
independence. "Culture and custom," the code words for the insistence
that time-honored use of public lands conveyed de facto ownership to
long-time users, became the watchwords of the Sagebrush Rebellion.
Hardly different from "squatters' rights," this idea lacked a basis in law,
but it resonated on the stump. Although many western states had never
even owned the land that sagebrush rebels targeted for transfer, the idea
of more local control was appealing. This was not local land, as
sagebrush rebels liked to insist. It was merely "locally located,"
proximate to people who had made long use of it under federal terms.
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Nevertheless, the Sagebrush Rebellion spoke to deep-seated regional
fears that crystallized in the rural West. The individual rights revolution
of the 1960s, the growing distrust of authority and the federal
government in particular, and the impact of environmental regulation
inspired fear and disgust at what some westerners self-righteously
believed was a powerful federal lash. The strident cries of the rebels
reminded the nation of the fears of rural westerners and many who
found inspiration in the mythology of the American West offered at least
tacit support.
Two different segments of American society seemed juxtaposed
in a zero-sum conflict. One would win; the other would lose. One side
saw itself as the heir to the Jeffersonian tradition of the Agrarian
Republic, individual yeoman farmers and ranchers who believed that
they were the honest backbone of American society. On the other side
stood an impressive array of Americans, many of whom lived elsewhere
but professed belief in a set of goals that could best be described as
communitarian. The reason for protecting such lands and keeping them
in federal hands was simply so that all Americans, if they chose, could
enjoy them. The different levels of protection, from restrictive wilderness
to limited national park area to almost open BLM land, created a scale
that allowed anyone either the solitude and quiet they coveted or use of
the technological gizmos they craved.
Clearly class plays a role in such disputes over land and water
and environmental historians have begun to study its role in shaping the
values that surround environmental history. This work has been carried
on mostly by younger scholars and is beginning to make an impact on
the field. Louis S. Warren, The Hunter's Game: Poachers and
Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America (Yale 1997), and Karl
Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden
History of American Conservation (California 2001), have begun a new
dialogue that reframes conservationists, and by inference later
environmentalists, as powerful purveyors of a class-based value system
that is regarded as oppressive by those who do not share such values.
While this would be a simple dispute in most circumstances, the power
of the conservationists, the ones determining what is permissible, was so
much greater than their opponents that it relegated opposing values to a
bottom rung and criminalized behavior that locals thought normal. In
this, such scholars set up an argument that conservationists were elitist, a
charge made in recent years against environmentalists by non-white
groups as well as scholars such as Robert Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race,
Class, and Environmental Quality (Westview 1990); Devon G. P~na, ed.,
Subversive Kin: Chicano Culture, Ecology, and Politics (Arizona 1998); and
Laura Pulido, Environmentalism and Economic Justice: Two Chicano
Struggles in the Southwest (Arizona 1996). Such works present a different
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dimension of the challenge offered by the Sagebrush Rebels, suggesting
an even greater role for class in future analysis.
Environmental History and Policy in the Real World
In 2000, Clark County, Nevada, home to Las Vegas, created an
Endangered Species Act Habitat Conservation Plan for seventy-nine
endangered species in the 200-mile long county. Hailed as model by no
less a luminary than then-Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, the plan
set a fee of $550 per acre for species mitigation. Developers had to pay
before they could proceed. For once, the Endangered Species Act seemed
to work. None of the finger pointing, the threats to bring political power
to bear, or the requisite lawsuits to enforce its provisions followed. In Las
Vegas?
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was perhaps the most
contentious piece of environmental legislation ever passed. Born of the
bipartisan environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s, it perfectly reflected
the traits of the era that spawned it. The ESA came from a flush society,
where putting aside economic resources to preserve threatened species
was tenable because of the widespread sense that everyone had enough
of the pie to give up a little. In some ways, the ESA was as class-based as
the turn-of-the-twentieth-century conservation movement; in others,
especially in the power of its provisions, it stemmed from much later
development of the regulatory state. Its advocates were passionate about
its application; its opponents apoplectic about its very existence. In 1978,
five years after its passage, the ESA nearly stopped the construction of
the Tellico Dam. It seemed the epitome of 1970s environmentalism.
Then the curtain came down. OPEC, Vietnam War-related
inflation, and the end of post-war prosperity all hit at once, best
epitomized by the rising cost of gasoline for which the nation stood in
line in 1974. In an instant, the pillars of post-war prosperity, cheap
energy, the rising value of wages, and low inflation, came crashing
down. The United States faced a new world, one with far fewer
opportunities. Beginning in 1974, the United States entered a 23-year
period that in essence represented a regression to the American mean.
The catalyst was the annual drop-for each of those 23 years-in the real
value of hourly wages. Simply put, people worked longer hours to stay
where they were on the socio-economic ladder. One-income families
declined; it took more hours to make the grade in each successive year
and middle-class women entered the workforce in greater numbers than
even earlier times in American history. The period between 1945 and
1974 was a great aberration, an era in which one typical income went
farther than at any other point in American history.
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A product of the heady time when Americans truly thought they
could permanently solve problems like poverty and disease and they
possessed a pie big enough that pieces of it could be kept out of
commercial use forever, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 came at a
time when the conditions that created it-and nearly every other piece of
environmental legislation that followed the Wilderness Act of
1964-were rapidly coming to an end. That brand of environmentalism
was a product of wealth, idealism, and optimism, once abundant traits
that became scarce after the mid-1970s. Bipartisan environmentalism
came apart as the economic rules of post-World War II American society
ceased to apply. As the nation lost industries like electronics and nearly
gave up others like automobiles, holding back resources for social rather
than economic purposes made sense to fewer politicians. Designed for an
era of plenty, the ESA became controversial in a more lean time.
Yet in Las Vegas, where money was at the root of every
transaction in a clear and candid way, the ESA applied as it did nowhere
else in post-1975 American society. The ESA was first invoked in 1989 to
protect the desert tortoise, threatening to bring a nascent development
boom in Las Vegas to a screeching halt. On August 4, 1989, Secretary of
the Interior Manuel Lujan, Jr., a New Mexican and no environmentalist
by any measure, implemented the Endangered Species Act emergency
provisions to protect the tortoise. The filing sent shivers through Las
Vegas developers. By 1989, big national players had seen what Las Vegas
had to offer. The world's largest master-planned community in the
world, twenty-six square miles of the northwest Las Vegas Valley
containing more than 35,000 acres of land, was underway at a cost of
more than $60 million in infrastructure for this project. The entire project
was located almost entirely on prime desert tortoise habitat, and under
the ESA emergency provisions, it and everything else in the
valley-flood control projects, new schools, roads, and homes-all
stopped cold. With the desert tortoise listed as an endangered species, no
work could proceed and developers could not discern any clear process
for mitigation.
As a' constellation of development forces sought to overturn
Lujan's order, one local government entity, Clark County, moved toward
a different solution. Seeing itself as a stakeholder and a facilitator, the
county initiated discussions with developers, the five incorporated
municipalities in the county, the Nature Conservancy, environmental
groups, recreation interests, and even ranchers and miners. On August
28, 1989, they formed the Clark County Desert Tortoise Habitat
Conservation Plan Steering Committee. The committee planned to find a
way through the wreckage and come up with a solution that
simultaneously complied with the ESA and let the developers continue.
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The motivation was money. With all of the forces in favor of
development lined up and heavily invested and a recession that drove
Californians east by the thousands, there was too much profit at stake to
run the risk of being stopped. In a low tax state like Nevada, growth paid
whatever portion of the bills that tourists did not. Impact fees, user fees,
and the like were an essential part of the budget of every governmental
entity-city, county, and even state-and the threat of the termination of
that source of revenue brought people to the table. The City of Las Vegas
estimated that the tortoise listing would cost $11 million in lost revenues
during the first year alone. Developers recognized that the vast profits
aching to be taken from the construction of new subdivisions were in
peril. They had experienced the ups and downs of the previous years
and with the opening of the Mirage, the Excalibur, and all the other
hotels along the Strip that took Las Vegas from gambling to gaming to
tourism to entertainment in a decade, anybody with the heart of a
developer recognized that this was the moment. Litigation, even
successful litigation, took way too long. They had to build and build
now. The only way was to reach some kind of,compromise.
A clause in the ESA permitted "incidental taking" of individual
members of a listed species if a plan to further the survival of the species
as a whole made compromise possible. A strategy that stemmed from the
flush days of the 1970s, this clause allowed the creation of a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP). Applied in Clark County, it might save the
tortoise and not wreck the local economy. In a community that had been
on the periphery of American society for so long, the chance for growth
and the legitimization that came from it was too valuable to be too
expensive. Under the circumstances, if an HCP cost a lot, so be it. The
developers knew they could make more, the city and county knew its
revenue stream, dependent on growth, would continue, and tortoise
advocates figured they could save the species in the process.
Here was incontrovertible proof that the ESA was a full-stomach
phenomena rooted in the environmental ethic of the 1970s. Developers
agreed to pay for the privilege of continuing to build on land where
development had begun before the listing date of August 4, 1989, and the
Clark County Short Term Habitat Conservation Plan was cobbled
together. Tortoise advocates asked for $2.3 million for research, land
acquisition, and a conservation center away from the main corridors of
regional growth. In exchange, developers were allowed to continue to
build on 7,000 acres at a fee of $250 per acre.
The program worked so well that in the course of a decade, the
short-term plan led first to a long-term HCP and finally to another
incidental take permit for 79 other species and received approval in
November 2000. The battle between developers, the environmental
community, and the law in Clark County ended without protracted
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litigation. Not everyone got everything they wanted, but nearly everyone
could live with the result. The grease was money. The roots of the ESA in
affluence and optimism made it possible to mitigate with the application
of dollars. The law had been written from a set of assumptions that made
it viable in 1990s Las Vegas. Full stomach environmentalism met
unbridled capitalism for the first time in two decades. Everyone, even
developers, became environmentalists when enough money was
involved, and in Clark County, Nevada, there was more than enough
money to go around.
Even more stunning, Las Vegas initiated a pattern that became a
model for the rest of the nation for resolving ESA disputes. When Bruce
Babbitt hailed the 2000 multi-species plan as the example he intended to
use to show people how ESA compromises could be accomplished, he
unconsciously illustrated the importance of environmental history for
policy makers. The ESA had been controversial; an analysis of its origins
revealed a series of values encoded in it that worked in specific
circumstances. Problems began when the economic situation in the
nation changed, making the assumptions that underpinned the design of
the law archaic. The rancor disappeared when the circumstances
recurred, as they did in Las Vegas in the 1990s. The law had been applied
with so little rancor there that the experience heartened people on both
sides of environmental disputes. Nowhere else had developers and the
environmental community found a solution that everyone could live
with. The idiosyncratic town in the desert, the one that everyone pointed
to as the worst example of environmental excess, had something
significant to offer American environmentalism.
It also highlighted why, despite Babbitt's hope, the Clark County
HCP model was unlikely to be widely emulated. The circumstances in
Las Vegas were unusual and reminiscent of an earlier era, and they were
decidedly not the norm throughout the nation. The tools of
environmental history revealed not only why the policy worked in Clark
County, but also why it would not in most other situations. In that, it
proves a prescient guide for scholars of natural resources.
In the end, environmental history has much to show scholars as
they assess policy. Law is not created in a vacuum, and the context of
creation is, in the end, as important as the results of the process.
Environmental history explains that process, grounding it in time and
articulating the premises that underlie law. In this sense, it is a precursor
of policy, a necessary corollary to understanding the law itself.

